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Introduction
As is well known, Ky Fan's inequality is used widely in many aspects of nonlinear analysis (e.g., see [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ). Recently, some set-valued versions of Ky Fan's inequality for set-valued mappings are obtained and also applied to variational inclusion theory, fixed point theory, contingent derivative, optimal and equilibrium theory, etc. (see [7] [8] [9] ). The classical Ky Fan's inequality demands domain of the function involved is a convex compact set. A kind of non-compact sets called σ -compact set is defined and some generalized KKM theorems are obtained in [10] . A generalized Ky Fan's inequality on a closed set is given in [6] .
Inspired and motivated by the results mentioned above, in this paper, we will discuss some variational inclusion problems and verify the existence of non-cooperative equilibrium in n-person game theory on a σ -compact set by using the version of Ky Fan's inequality on the set. A fixed point theorem and some results about variational inclusions are obtained in Section 3 after preliminaries in Section 2. We gave an existence theorem for non-cooperative equilibrium in n-person games in which the set of multistrategies is a σ -compact convex subset in Section 4. The corresponding results in [3] are generalized.
Preliminaries
Let X be a real normed vector space with topological dual X * , and ·,· be the duality pairing between X and X * . If K is a nonempty subset of X, we always assume that ϕ : K × K → R is a given function. For x 0 ∈ X and η > 0, we denote the closed ball centered at x 0 with radius η by
We recall that the domain of an extended-real-valued function f : X →R := R ∪ {+∞} is the set where it is finite and is denoted by dom(f ) := {x ∈ X: f (x) < +∞}. A function f : X →R is said to be lower semi-continuous (lsc) at
We say that f is lsc if it is lsc everywhere in its domain. A function f is said to be upper semi-continuous (usc) if −f is lsc. 
f (x).
Let X and Y be two normed vector spaces and F : X → 2 Y be a set-valued map. We write Gr(F ) := {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ F (x)} for the graph of F and dom(F ) := {x ∈ X:
A set-valued map F : X → 2 Y is said to be lower semi-continuous (lsc) at x ∈ dom(F ) if and only if for any y ∈ F (x) and for any sequence of elements x n in X converging to x, there exists a sequence of elements y n ∈ F (x n ) converging to y. The set-valued map F : X → 2 Y is said to be upper semi-continuous (usc) at x 0 ∈ X if and only if for any neighborhood U of F (x 0 ), there exists η > 0 such that for every x ∈ B X (x 0 , η), we have F (x) ⊂ U . F is said to be lsc (respectively usc) on a subset A ⊂ X if it is lsc (respectively usc) at every point in A ∩ dom(F ).
The support function of the subset K of the normed vector space X is defined by
where p ∈ X * . A set-valued map C : X → 2 Y is said to be upper hemi-continuous at x 0 ∈ K ⊂ X if and only if for all p ∈ Y * , the function σ (C(x), p) is upper semi-continuous at x 0 . It is said to be upper hemi-continuous on K if it is upper hemi-continuous at every point x 0 ∈ K. Remark 2.2. Any upper semi-continuous mapping is upper hemi-continuous. The graph of an upper hemi-continuous set-valued map with convex closed values is closed (see [3] ).
For more discussion about the lsc, usc, hemi-continuous mappings and the support function, we refer to [1] [2] [3] [4] .
In the following, we need also the next definition and theorem which can be find in [7] .
Theorem 2.4. [7, Theorem 3.2] Let X be a finite-dimensional real normed vector space, K a convex and σ -compact subset of X, Y a real normed vector space, M a nonempty subset in Y and
F : K × K → 2 Y a set-valued map. Suppose that (i) the set-valued map U : K → 2 K , defined by U(x) := {u ∈ K: (x, u) ∈ F −1 (Y \M)}, is lsc on K; (ii) for each finite set {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } ⊂ K, conv{u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } ⊂ {x ∈ K: ∃i = 1, . . . , n, F (x, u i ) ⊂ M}; (iii) there is a nonempty compact subset A of K such that for every x ∈ K\A there exists u ∈ A satisfying F (x, u) ∩ (Y \M) = ∅. Then there existsx ∈ K such that F (x, u) ⊂ M for every u ∈ K.
Fixed point theorem and variational inclusions
We first introduce a lemma which is important for our discussion in the sequel, and present a fixed point theorem and then three results about variational inclusions.
Lemma 3.1. Let K be a nonempty σ -compact convex subset of the finite-dimensional real normed vector space X and let f : K × K →R be a function such that
Then there existsx ∈ K such that sup y∈K f (x, y) sup x∈K f (x, x).
We observe that assumptions (ii) and (iii) ensure that the conditions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2.4 hold. The assumption (i) 
Proof. We set
Then for every (x, y) ∈ K × K, ϕ(x, y) is continuous and for every x ∈ K, ϕ(x, y) is concave with respect to y ∈ K, i.e., the conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.1 are satisfied. From the assumptions, we know that the condition (iii) of Lemma 3.1 is also satisfied. So there existsx ∈ K such that 
there is a nonempty compact subset A of K such that for every x ∈ K\A, there exists y ∈ A satisfying σ (C(x), y) < 0; and
Proof. We consider the function
This function is concave in y ∈ K (since y → σ (C(x), y) is convex) and is lsc in x on K. It follows from the conditions (iii) and (iv) that, for each x ∈ K\A, there exists y ∈ A satisfying
i.e., σ (C(x), y) 0, ∀y ∈ K. Since σ (−R n + , y) = 0 whenever y ∈ R n + and σ (−R n + , y) = +∞ whenever y / ∈ R n + , it is equivalent to 0 σ C(x) − R n + , y , ∀y ∈ R n .
Since C(x) − R n + is a convex and closed subset, it follows from the separation theorem that if 0 / ∈ C(x) − R n + then there exists y ∈ R n , such that σ (C(x) − R n + , y) < 0, which is a contradiction. This implies C(x) ∩ R n + = ∅. 2
Remark 3.4.
Under the condition that K is a compact subset of R n , Debru, Gale and Nikaïdo obtained a theorem which is known as Debru-Gale-Nikaïdo Theorem. Here we give the same result of the Debru-Gale-Nikaïdo Theorem under different conditions. Also it is well known that when C is upper hemi-continuous, the function ϕ(x, y) := −σ (C(x), y) is lsc in x on K (see [3] ).
Theorem 3.5. Let K be a σ -compact and convex subset of a finite-dimensional normed vector space X and let S : K → 2 X be a lsc set-valued map. Suppose that (i) there exists a nonempty compact subset A ⊂ K such that for every x ∈ K\A, there exist t ∈ S(x) and u ∈ A satisfying
t, u − x < 0;
(ii) for any finite subset
Then there existsx ∈ K such that t, u −x 0, for all t ∈ S(x) and u ∈ A.
Proof. Let Y = R, M = [0, +∞), we introduce the following set-valued mappings:
and
We first show that U is lsc on K. Since S is lsc on K, i.e., for any x ∈ K, t ∈ S(x) and {x n } ⊂ K, x n → x as n → +∞, there exists t n ∈ S(x n ) such that t n → t. For sufficient large n, we have t n , u− x n < 0 whenever u ∈ U(x). This is to say u ∈ U(x n ) for sufficient large n. So U is lsc on K. On the other hand, U(x) = {u ∈ K: F (x, u) ∩ (−∞, 0) = ∅} = {u ∈ K: (x, u) ∈ F −1 (Y \M)}, ∀x ∈ K. So the condition (i) of Theorem 2.4 is satisfied.
Secondly, we show that the condition (ii) of Theorem 2.4 is satisfied. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exist a finite subset {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } ⊂ K and u 0 ∈ conv{u 1 
which is a contradiction with the assumption (ii).
Finally, from the assumption (i), we know the condition (iii) of Theorem 2.4 is also satisfied.
Therefore there existsx ∈ K such that t, u −x 0, for all t ∈ S(x), u ∈ A. 2
Next we will verify a quasi-variational inequality.
Theorem 3.6. Let K be a σ -compact convex subset of a finite-dimensional normed space X and let C : K → 2 X be an upper hemi-continuous set-valued mapping with nonempty convex closed values. We consider a function
ϕ(x, y) 0 = ∅, and for every x ∈ K\A, there exists u ∈ A ∩ C(x) satisfying
Then there exists a pointx ∈ K satisfying
Proof. We shall argue by reduction to the absurd. Denote α(x) = sup y∈C (x) ϕ(x, y) . If the conclusion is false for all x ∈ K, we would have either α(x) > 0 or x / ∈ C(x). The later implies that there exists p ∈ X * such that p, x − σ (C(x), p) > 0. We set (a) V 0 := {x ∈ K: α(x) > 0}, and
Where K = ∞ n=1 K n and each K n is a compact subset of X.
Obviously, for each K n , we have
The assumption on the set-valued map C and the condition (i) imply that the sets V 0 and V n (p) are open. Since each K n is compact, there exist finite p n1 , p n2 , . . . , p nm n such that
By the unity partition theorem, there exists a continuous partition of unity Now we define the function ψ :
For each x ∈ K, it follows from (1) that only finite g ni (x) p ni , x − y are nonzero in some neighborhood of x. From assumptions (i) and (ii), we know that ψ(x, y) is lower semicontinuous in x and concave in y.
Next we show that ψ(x, y) satisfying the condition (iii) of Lemma 3.1. Indeed, since
Hence,
If x ∈ V 0 \A, we also have
By Lemma 3.1, there existsx ∈ K such that sup y∈K ψ(x, y) 0.
We shall contradict this inequality by proving that there existsȳ ∈ K such that ψ(x,ȳ) > 0. We take . . . is a partition of unity, we have g ni (x) > 0 for at least one index i = 1, 2, . . . . So ψ(x,ȳ) > 0 follows from the assertion: 
Non-cooperative equilibrium in n-person games
Now we consider the decision rules of n plays that are determined by loss functions. In [3] , the set of multi-strategies E is a compact set. In this section, we discuss the situations in which the set E is not compact and give a result of the existence for non-cooperative equilibrium in n-person games in which the set of multi-strategies is a σ -compact convex subset.
Let E i ⊂ R,Ê i = n j =i E i ,x i = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) ∈Ê i . The set of multistrategies x := (x i ,x i ) may be written as the set E := E i ×Ê i . In a n-person game, the behavior of the ith player is defined by a loss function. The related conceptions and discussions can be find in [2] [3] [4] . Definition 4.1. [3] The ith player's loss function f i is defined by f i : E → R, which evaluates the loss of the ith player inflicted by each multi-strategy x ∈ E.
The associated decision rules are defined by
Now we defined C :
